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93

LAW-DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-RIGHT
TO TRIAL BY JURY.
An automobile liability insurer sued for a declaratory judgment'
regarding liability to an insured motorist and his injured guest, and
for cancellation of the policy as to any liability growing out ox an
accident. Held, insured and his guest were entitled to the jury trial
which they demanded on the issues of allegedly false statements made
by the insured to the insurer regarding the accident, and an alleged
breach by the insured of the customary co-operation clause, since in an
action against the insurer by the injured third person such matters
would be legal issues triable by jury. Pacific Indemnity Co. v.
McDonald et al., 21 F. Supp. 122, (D. Ore. 1938).
Fraud on an insurer occurring at the inception of the contract operates to give the defrauded insurer an election of remedies: (1) a good
defense to an action at law on the policy by the injured third person,
2
the question of fraud being normally for a jury; (2) an equitable suit
for rescission or cancellation of the policy, the matter of jury trial to
be governed by established rules of procedure in equity. The breach
of conditions subsequent in the principal case was made the basis of a
suit for a declaration of non-liability, the breach of such conditions
to an action at law
being a good defense, by the weight of authority,
4
on the policy by the injured third person.
CONSTITUTIONAL

It has been said that declaratory judgment proceedings are based
upon equitable principles which lay at the foundation of bills quia
timet. Accordingly, a noted author has said that "the power granted
by the declaratory judgment statutes is more strictly a direction to use
an existing power than an authorization of new power."' Under these
theories, the constitutional guaranty of jury trial cannot be invoked
In declaratory proceedings, because the action is essentially equitable.
state that passengers are covered by the policy only when: (1) he is
riding as a paying passenger, (2) he must be in a licensed plane,
(3) the plane must be owned by an incorporated passenger carrier,
(4) the plane must be operated by a licensed pilot, and (5) it must be
operated over routes between definitely established airports.
1
Jud. Code Sec. 274d, 28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 400 (Mar. 3, 1911, c. 231,
Sec. 274d, as added June 14, 1934, c. 512, 48 Stat. 955, as amended
Aug. 30, 1935, c. 829, Sec. 405, 49 Stat. 1027).
2Cf. extended annotation of Hynding v. Home Accident Ins. Co.,
214 Cal. 743, 7 Pac. (2d) 999 (1932), in 85 A. L. R. 13, at 58, subd.
XIV a.
1Id. at 63, b and c.
4Royal Indemnity Co. v. Watson, 61 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 5th,
1932); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wyer, 60 F. (2d) 856
(C. C. A. 10th, 1932); Metropolitan Casualty Co. v. Blue, 219 Ala. 37,
121 So. 25 (1929); Harrison v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
225 Ill. App. 263 (1929).
6
Hann v. Venetian Blind Corp., 15 F. Supp. 372, at 375 (C. Cal.,
1936).
0
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (1934) p. 137; see also Gavit,
Procedure Under the Uniform DeclaratoryJudgment Act (1933), 8 Ind.
L J. 409, at 418.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL,

Furthermore, "the right to have equity controversies dealt with by
equitable methods is as sacred as the -rightof trial by jury. ' 7 Therefore,
if these statutes are considered as merely extending the application of
an existing branch of equity jurisdiction, solutions of the jury question
under comparable statutes are in point. Thus, statutes conferring
jurisdiction upon courts of equity to enjoin public nuisances have been
upheld as against contentions that such statutes violate the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury.8 Similar results have been reached
concerning statutes providing for the use of the injunction to prevent
crime.' The constitutional principle is that the right to trial by jury
is guaranteed "in suits at common law", having reference to the condition of the law as it existed at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution.P
Analysis of the problem is made more difficult by the view that
declaratory relief is neither strictly equitable nor legal, although its
historical sources are almost exclusively equitable."
However, in
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quaresu the court based its decision
entirely upon the nature of the issues to be tried, and the method
under which they would be tried without the intervention of a declaratory judgment statute. The case involved a breach of a co-operation
clause in a policy, the holding being that in a declaratory proceeding
such defenses must be tried at law if either party insists; further,
that irrespective of the statutory provisionu the right of jury trial in
what is essentially an action at law may not be denied a litigant merely
because his adversary asked that the controversy be determined under
the declaratory procedure.u
S
Wnz
Brown v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 274, 42 N. W. 827
(1889).
8
Mugler v. Kansas. 123 U. S. 123, 8 S. Ct. 273 (1887); Fulton v.
State, 171 Ala. 572, 54 So. 688 (1911); Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134
Ia. 31 (1890); Chase v. Revere House, 232 Mass. 88, 122 N. E. 162
(1919); see also Gregg v. People, 65 Colo. 390, 176 Pac. 483 (1918);
King v. Coim. ex rel. Smith, 194 Ky. 143, 238 S. W. 373 (1922). The
analogy arises from the fact that such statutes extend the existing
equitable power to enjoin, to fields wherein it was not previously
exercised.
9S. D. Thompson, Injunctions against Criminal Acts (1884) 18
Am. L. Rev. 599; Rogers, Use of the Injunction to Prevent Crime (1932)
20 Ky. L. J. 329, at 338.
0Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283 (1860), and reporter's note
thereto.
' Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (1934)
p. 120. At page 138,
the author says: "The source of the power ought not to be considered
as of any other than historical importance, for in principle declaratory
relief is sui generis and is as much legal as equitable."
92 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
128 U. S. C. A. Sec. 400 (3): "When a declaratory of right or the
granting of further relief based thereon shall involve the determination of issues of fact triable by jury, such issues may be submitted to
a jury in the form of interrogatories, with proper instructions by the
court,
1 4 whether a general verdict be required or not."
See also Travelers Insurance Co. v. Helmer et al.. 11 F. Supp. 355
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ADVERSE POSSESSION-EFFECT OF AN UNEXPECTED JUDGMENT IN EJECTMENT ON THE CONTINUITY OF ADVERSE
POSSESSION.
Appellants entered upon a tract of land about 1903 and remained
In possesion thereof continuously until 1934 when they conveyed it to
appellee by warranty deed. However, in 1916 (18 years before the
conveyance) a judgment in ejectment had been recovered against them
by a third party. There was no writ of execution or other process
issued on this judgment, and no change of possession. Appellee
brought action for a return of the purchase money and cancellation
of the deed, alleging that appellants had no title to the property at the
time of the conveyance. Appellants contended that since no action was
over taken on the 1916 judgment, and more than fifteen years had
olapsed, it was now ineffectual and their title to the land was good
at the date of conveyance. Held that appellants had no title, because
the 1916 judgment settled conclusively the rights of the parties, and
that so long as the judgment was in effect appellants were estopped to
claim title, so that their possession from 1916 to 1931 was not adverse
within the meaning of the statute of limitations. Creech v. Jenkins,
276 Ky. 163, 123 S. W. (2d) 267 (1938).
There are three different views or positions taken by the courts
as to the effect of an unexecuted judgment in ejectment on the running
of the statute of limitations, viz: (1) a judgment, not executed, has no
effect on the running of the statute, i. e., the continuity of adverse
possession is not broken; (2) a judgment, though unexecuted, breaks
the continuity of adverse possesion, but the statute of limitations may
start running again, if no action is taken, although the judgment is
still alive and could be enforced; (3) a judgment, although not
executed, not only breaks the continuity of adverse possession but
estops the defendant to claim title and suspends the running of the
statute of limitations during the life of the judgment.
Early Kentucky decisions accepted the doctrine of Smith v.
Hornback which is in accord with the first view. In 1916 Smith v.
(D. Ga. 1936); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Havens, 24 F. Supp. 460
(D. Pa. 1938).
Compare cases holding that the interposition by a defendant in
an equitable action of a counterclaim of a legal nature, gives him no
right to a jury trial, either of the case generally or of the issue raised
by the counterclaim: Angus v. Craven, 132 Cal. 691, 64 Pac. 1091
(1901); Gatch v. Garretson, 100 Ia. 252, 69 N. W. 550 (1896); Newhern
v. Farris, 149 Okla. 74, 299 Pac. 192 (1931); Burns v. Corn Exchange
National Bank, 33 Wyo. 474, 240 Pac. 633 (1925).
Smith v. Hornback, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 232, 14 Am. Dec. 122 (1883)
held that a judgment in ejectment, never executed and under which
possession has never been surendered, does not stop the running of the
statute of limitations. Accord: Pleak v. Chambers, 35 Ky. (5 Dana)
62 (1837); Petty v. Malier, 15 B. Mon. 591, 54 Ky. 474 (1855); Martin v.
Hall, 152 Ky. 677, 153 S. W. 997 (1913). See also Rice's Heirs v. Lowan,
5 Ky. (2 Bib) 149 (1810).
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Hornback was clearly overruled by Perry v. Eagle Coal Company2 which
apparently is in accordance with the second view. This view is more
logical and supported by the weight of authority in this country.2
In the Perry case the plaintiff claimed title by adverse possession
and alleged that the title of the defendant in error was champertous and
void because it was secured while the land was held in adverse possession. A judgment in ejectment rendered against plaintiff in error
twelve years before the institution of the action had never been
executed and he had remained in possession thereof. Title had been
acquired by defendent in error from the plaintiff in the first action,
after the judgment was rendered. In its decision the court distinguished between adverse possession which is sufficient under the statute
of limitations and such adverse possession as would make a deed void
under the statute against champerty. To quote the language of the
court:
.. . but a possession sufficient under the statute of limitations is, in many instances, not sufficient adverse possession to
make void a conveyance of land under the statute against
champerty."
The judgment was held to be conclusive as to the rights of the
parties, and that plaintiff in error was estopped to deny the title of
the owner, during the life of the judgment, and that therefore his
possession was not such adverse possession as would render the conveyance by the owner void. In considering the plea of title by adverse
possession, by plaintiff in error, it was held that his adverse possession
had been interrupted by the judgment and that twelve years adverse
possession after the Judgment was not sufficient to acquire title under
the statute of limitations. The language of the court strongly indicates
-170 Ky. 824, 186 S.W. 875 (1916).
In Corpus Juris (2 C. J. p. 109, Sec. 168) it is said that according
to the weight of authority the mere recovery of a judgment in ejectment will not of itself stop the running of the statute of limitationsthat there must be an actual change in possession. But Corpus Juris
Secundum (2 C.J.S. p. 725, Sec. 153) reads that in some jurisdictions a
judgment in ejectment will not interrupt the continuity of adverse
possesion if the judgment is not executed but that elsewhere the judgment of itself, without execution, will change the character of such
possession from being adverse "for the time being at least" and stops
the running of the statute of limitations "at that point of time."
Courts are vague as to their position on the first two views and
generally fail to distinguish between them when they refuse to adopt
the third. The facts in most of the cases cited in support of the rule
that the judgment has no effect, show that sufficient time had elapsed
for the running of the statute since the judgment, not necessarily holding that the continuity of the adverse possession was not broken. Likewise, in the cases holding that the adverse possession was interrupted,
the judgment was still alive when the action was brought or sufficient
time had not elapsed since the judgment for the running of the statute.
So they do not necessarily hold that possession after the judgment was
not adverse. No recent case in any other jurisdiction is found whose
facts and holding are parallel to those of the principal case and its two
precedents (see note 5, infra) in Kentucky.
2
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that it considered the adverse possession sufficient under the statute
of limitations to vest title, had there been sufficient time elapsed, when
it says:
"In this case in order to constitute a good plea of adverse
possession, it would be necessary to deny that only 12 years, or any
less than 15 years, had transpired between the rendition of the
judgment in the suit of the Barren Fork Mining & Coal Company
against appellant and the institution of this suit, which denial
was not made."
When viewed as a whole the Perry case sets out three points:
(a) the judgment in ejectment breaks the continuity of adverse possession, and (b) the statute of limitations must start running again
from that point of time, but (c) the doctrine of estoppel may be applied
to any action or defense by the defendant against the plaintiff or his
successor, so long as the judgment is alive. Since the decision was
rendered in this case it has been generally accepted by the courts as
the law of Kentucky on this matter. 4 But in applying the doctrine
of estoppel the unnecessary attempt of the court to justify its application by speaking of two kinds of adverse possession has been
misleading.
When the court in the instant case and its two precedents,. decided
since 1930, purport to follow the Perry case it is apparent that they rely
upon the language of the court, in that case, wherein the doctrine of
estoppel was applied. Such language of the court was not applicable,
or at the most. mere dicta, to the plea of title by adverse possession
and by relying upon it a result was reached which is far different
from that reached in the Perry case, and one never intended by it.
Greene v. Strubbe" held that where one retains possession after judgment in ejectment against him, his possesion is not adverse in absence
of notice to the owner. However, in that case the defendant was an
old man and the plaintiff permitted him to continue to live on the
land, and though he died within five years, his family lived on until
the action was instituted about 25 years after judgment was rendered.
I Tennis Coal Co. v. Sackett, 172 Ky. 729, 190 S.W. 130 (1916) held
that "any adverse possession, which he might have had or claimed
before the institution of the action in which the judgment was rendered is extinguished by the judgment, and if he would create a title
to the lands, in himself, he must remain in adverse possession of the
land for fifteen years after the judgment." Travis v. Bruce, 172 Ky.
729, 189 S.W. 939 (1916) recognized and accepted this same doctrine.
Kentucky Union Co. v. Cornett, 284 Ky. 360, 58 S.W. (2d) 655 (1933)
held that a judgment rendered less than 15 years before the action
was instituted had interrupted the adverse possession and no title was
acquired by virtue of the statute of limitations. Whether possesion
after the judgment was considered as adverse, by the court, is not
clear from the case. Greene v. Strubbe and Angel v. Le Moyne (see
note 5) cite the Perry case as authority but reach a decision quite
different.
5 Greene v. Strubbe, 234 Ky. 380, 28 S. W. (2d) 469 (1930); Angel v.
Le Moyne, 237 Ky. 366, 35 S.W. (2d) 540 (1931).
4234 Ky. 380, 28 S.W. (2d) 469 (1930).

KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
It might be considered that at least part of this possession was by
consent of the owner, and hence not clearly within the third view.
Although it is clearly not in point, Clark v. City of Hendersonw may have
influenced the court in its decision in the Greene case. In Angel v.
Le Moyneg it was held that where a party continued in possession after
adverse judgment determining title, time between rendition of the
judgment and its expiration by limitation could not be counted in
determining adverse possession for the statutory period. There Is
some doubt as to whether the facts of that case necessarily bring it
within the third view. The facts of the principal case and its holding
clearly place it in accord with the third view. Here, appellants continued in possesion of the land, so far as evidence shows, in the same
adverse manner as before, for eighteen years, no action ever being
taken on the judgment. Yet they were adjudged to have no title by
adverse possession.
To hold that the defendant's possession retained during the life of
an unexecuted judgment cannot be adverse to the plaintiff gives, in
effect, a greater force to an unexecuted judgment than to one executed.
Such holding tends to defeat the very purpose for which the statute of
limitations was enacted. Suppose that the judgment is executed and
the defendant is dispossessed. Shortly thereafter he again gains possession under some other unfounded claim of title. Is it not likely
that his possession thus would be considered as adverse and if it so
continued for fifteen years would give title to him? Should the adverse
possession of such a defendant be any less obnoxious to the statute of
limitations than that of a different party? If the possession of the
defendant cannot be counted as adverse during the life of the judgment, then the title to the land and the right of possession may rest
in obscurity and uncertainty for thirty years instead of not more than
fifteen years as contemplated by the statute.
It is submitted that in the principal case and in Angel v. Le Moyne
and Greene v. Strubbe the court has been misled by the language of the
decisions where champerty was alleged, or for some other reason, the
doctrine of estoppel was applied. That "defendant is estopped to deny
the title of the plaintiff or claim adverse possession" and that "defendant's possesion during the life of the judgment is not adverse", etc.,
have been construed as applying to the statute of limitations, and this
has resulted in the announcement of a rule contrary to sound principles of law and against the weight of authority.
PALxER L. HALL
7205 Ky. 779, 266 S.W. 664 (1924). This case held that possession
retained after consent judgment was rendered was not adverse.
8237 Ky. 366, 35 S.W. (2d) 540 (1931).
9 In the Angel case (see note 5, supra) a judgment was rendered in
1898 but not affirmed until 1901. The action was begun in 1914. So 15
years had not elapsed since the judgment became final and the Institution of the action. However, the language of the court indicates that
the possession after the judgment was not considered as adverse.

